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SUMMARY OF THESIS 
Substantive gender equality has yet to be achieved in South Africa. As such, when a 
decision is made for one of the spouses to a civil marriage to stay at home and care 
for the children born of the marriage, or make career sacrifices to care for children, 
that spouse is usually the wife. As a result, while the husband continues to amass 
wealth and grow his earning potential, the wife is unable to do so. In circumstances 
where such spouses are married out of community of property or subject to the accrual 
system with onerous exclusion clauses in the antenuptial contract, the wife may be left 
with little more than a claim for rehabilitative maintenance in the event of a divorce. 
The courts only have the discretion to make an equitable distribution of marital 
property in civil marriages with complete separation of property concluded prior to 1 
November 1984 (or 2 December 1988) and  customary marriages. It is arguable that 
this limitation of the judicial discretion violates the equality clause contained in the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. A broad judicial discretion to 
equitably redistribute the spouses’ assets upon divorce is therefore proposed in this 
dissertation. 
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CHAPTER ONE  
 
PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
This dissertation concerns the questions whether in its current state the 
South African matrimonial property distribution system on divorce negatively 
impacts upon the financially weaker spouse in a marriage and whether a 
more flexible and discretionary system applicable to civil marriages ending 
in divorce would be the answer to the current shortcomings. In addition, the 
promising inroads towards fairness and equity which have been made in 
areas of the law applicable to marriages falling out of the civil sphere such 
as customary marriage are contrasted to the more rigid structure applicable 
to civil marriages ending in divorce.  
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
The concepts of “family” and “family values” in the traditional paradigm 
contemplate a married couple with children.1 However, in the light of the 
changing societal norms and attitudes towards divorce in the Western world 
these concepts have for many years been challenged on an ever-increasing 
scale. Increasingly, couples worldwide are exercising their right to get 
divorced and their right to cohabit, without the need for a civil or religious 
stamp of approval, and to have children outside of wedlock.2  
 
Legislation in many countries, including South Africa, has grown and 
developed alongside the “divorce epidemic”.3 Prior to the promulgation of 
the Divorce Act 70 of 1979 our divorce law was a fault-based system which 
recognised an innocent and a guilty party, the grounds for divorce being 
adultery, malicious desertion, incurable mental illness lasting at least seven 
years, and imprisonment for at least five years after having been declared a 
habitual criminal.4 The principle of fault was utilised by the courts in reaching 
                                                             1 Sclater SD Divorce: A psychosocial study (1999) 2.  2 Sclater Divorce: A psychosocial study 4-5. 3 Sclater Divorce: A psychosocial study 2.  4 Hahlo HR The South African law of husband and wife 4th ed (1985) 330-331. 
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decisions pertaining to the patrimonial and related consequences of the 
divorce.  
 
1.2  GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
With the increasing acceptability of divorce as a social practice, Westernised 
legal systems have moved away from the concept of fault and guilt towards 
a system based purely on the breakdown of the relationship. The Divorce 
Act, which reflects the revolutionary ideas pertaining to divorce and the 
breakdown of marriages in Western society, was promulgated in 1979. 
Section 3 of the Divorce Act sets out the grounds for divorce in South Africa 
as being the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage and a spouse’s 
incurable mental illness or continuous unconsciousness. When the fault-
based system of divorce was abandoned, the concept of compensating a 
spouse for the wrongdoing of his or her spouse was greatly diluted. Certain 
vestiges of the fault-based system are, however, still evident in the 
provisions of sections 7(2) and 9 of the Divorce Act.5 Section 7(2) provides 
that a court in determining whether or not spousal maintenance will be 
awarded needs to consider, inter alia,  each spouse’s conduct in so far as it 
may be relevant to the breakdown of the marriage. Similarly, section 9 of the 
Divorce Act provides that substantial misconduct and the circumstances 
which led to the breakdown of the marriage are two of the three factors 
which the court will consider when making an order for forfeiture of 
patrimonial benefits. 
 
1.3  REVOLUTIONISED APPROACH TO FAMILIES, MARRIAGE AND 
DIVORCE 
 
A further and prominent characteristic of the move towards a revolutionised 
approach to families, marriage and divorce is a change in attitudes with a 
shift away from a patriarchal structure in which the husband is the 
breadwinner and provider and the wife a homemaker and mother, to one of 
spousal equality.6 In 1982, a South African Law Commission Report7 was                                                              5 Although s 7(3)-(6) of the Divorce Act does not expressly make provision for fault or misconduct, it can nonetheless be taken into account under s 7(4)(d), which provides that the court may take any other factor into account when making a redistribution order. 6 Sutherland EE “Imperatives and challenges in child and family Law” in Sutherland EE (ed) The 
future of child and family law international predictions (2012) 23. 
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published which reflected the growing move towards spousal equality in the 
context of matrimonial property.8 The 1982 Commission Report heralded the 
promulgation of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984, which introduced 
the accrual system into our matrimonial property law and ultimately the 
abolition of the marital power. Accordingly, after 1984 couples could elect to 
be married in community of property, out of community property (as they 
were entitled to do prior to 1984) or out of community of property with the 
inclusion of the accrual system. The intention of the South African 
Parliament was to ameliorate the hardships caused by out of community of 
property marriages.9  
 
The impression of lawmakers and courts in Westernised societies that 
women have attained equality in all spheres of their lives 10  has lent 
credence to a growing application in decisions by courts pertaining to the 
patrimonial consequences of divorce, including the division of marital 
property and the payment of maintenance, of what has become known as 
the “clean-break principle”.11 The principle has as its goal the expeditious 
termination of all financial ties between divorcing parties as soon as 
possible. The South African courts have welcomed the idea of the “clean 
break principle”, which was applied in Beaumont v Beaumont.12  
 
1.4  FLAWS IN THE CURRENT MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY 
DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM 
 
There are, however, various difficulties with the South African matrimonial 
property distribution system on divorce. Whilst the South African legal 
system, having the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 as its 
supreme law, 13  has made impressive and progressive strides towards 
satisfying the fundamental rights of human dignity and equality, inter alia,                                                                                                                                                                               7 SA Law Commission Project 15 The matrimonial property law with special reference to the 
Matrimonial Affairs Act, 1953, the status of married women, and the law of succession in so far as it 
affects spouses (1982). 8 Kaganas F and Murray C “Law and women’s rights in South Africa: An overview” in Murray C (ed) Gender and the new South African legal order (1994) 12. 9 Barratt A “‘Whatever I acquire will be mine and mine alone’: Marital agreements not to share in constitutional South Africa” 2013 SALJ 690. 10 Kaganas and Murray “Law and women’s rights” 14. 11 Kaganas and Murray “Law and women’s rights” 14. 12 1987 (1) SA 967 (A). 13 Heaton J “South Africa: Changing the contours of child and family law” in Sutherland EE (ed) 
The future of child and family law international predictions (2012) 400. 
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and while the law pertaining to the division of matrimonial property and 
spousal support appears to be a system of legal equality,14 in reality it is not. 
At first glance the system appears to be a fair one, enabling parties to freely 
and intelligently choose the contract or system which best suits them. 
However, on divorce a strict application of the contractual regime applicable 
to civil marriages and the “clean break” principle which is underpinned by 
the concept of equality between men and women in a marriage often leads 
to hardship for the financially weaker spouse.15 An inequitable distribution 
on divorce flowing from the strict application of the matrimonial property 
regime chosen by parties can nonetheless only be remedied by the 
operation of judicial discretion in very limited contexts, namely in civil 
marriages concluded prior to the promulgation of the Matrimonial Property 
Act16 (and the Marriage and Matrimonial Property Law Amendment Act 3 of 
1988). 17  The fact that, unlike civil marriages, all spouses in customary 
marriages which end in divorce have access to an equitable distribution on 
divorce, will be examined in chapter 4.18 
 
A spouse’s pension interest currently forms part of his or her estate for 
purposes of patrimonial claims;19 but this asset is very often excluded by the 
spouses in their antenuptial contract at the commencement of the 
relationship. Upon divorce, however, the pension interest very often equates 
to the asset of most value. A further exacerbating feature is the fact that a 
spouse’s income stream derived from their employment and experience 
within the workplace – which is usually enhanced by the spouse who 
assumes the lion’s share of the domestic responsibilities in regard to the 
children and the home – is not viewed, or treated, as an asset upon 
divorce.20  
 
In addition, although the choice women now have to structure their marital 
property regime in terms of an antenuptial contract may appear to make for                                                              14 Sutherland “Imperatives and challenges” 24. 15 Kaganas and Murray “Law and women’s rights” 14-15. 16 Ie on 1 November 1984. 17 Ie on 2 December 1988. 18 Whenever concluded, except polygamous customary marriages concluded before the promulgation of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998. 19 S 7(7) of the Divorce Act; s 37D of the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956. 20 Heaton J “Striving for substantive gender equality in family law: Selected issues” 2005 SAJHR 570.  
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fairness and equality, there are a myriad of factors which may well influence 
parties when entering into antenuptial contracts, as has been shown. An 
imbalance of financial power and occupational status leads to an imbalance 
of bargaining power.21 Parties may in addition be labouring under cognitive 
distortion and accordingly be unable to comprehend that their marriage may 
end in divorce and that their spouse may behave in a dishonourable way.22 
The situation that results may be far from ideal: because of her inability to 
properly assert her position and protect her interests in a worst case 
scenario, the wife-to-be may well choose a matrimonial property regime for 
herself that will ultimately be to her detriment. The difficulties experienced by 
women at the commencement of the marriage are usually still present at the 
termination of the relationship and are evidenced in their inability to 
negotiate adequately for a settlement of the issues which will enable them to 
live with dignity after divorce. 23  These issues are compounded by the 
interplay between men and women when they are embroiled in negotiations 
pertaining to the financial implications of the divorce and the primary 
residence entitlements. In view of the caregiving role which women assume 
in the family, they are often anxious to retain primary residency of the 
children born of the marriage and the threat of a counterapplication for 
primary residency can be utilised against them by a stronger spouse to 
induce them to accept a smaller financial settlement.24 
 
The premise of spousal equality or gender equality between spouses upon 
which, in particular, the clean-break principle and the accrual system are 
founded is problematic for many reasons. These reasons include the 
overriding fact that gender equality has not been fully realised25 nor can it in 
the context of the fact that women alone are able to bear children26 and in 
general still assume the lion’s share of the domestic and child-raising 
responsibilities.27 This trend continues after the dissolution of the marriage                                                              21 Heaton “Striving for gender equality” 550. 22 Heaton “Striving for gender equality” 554. 23 Heaton “Striving for gender equality” 566-567. 24 Heaton “Striving for gender equality” 567; Bonthuys E “Labours of love: Child custody and the division of matrimonial property at divorce” 2001 THRHR 209. 25 Sutherland “Imperatives and challenges” 23. 26 Sutherland “Imperatives and challenges” 23. 27 De Jong M “New trends regarding the maintenance of spouses upon divorce” 1999 THRHR 79; Fineman MA “Societal factors affecting the creation of legal rules for distribution of property at divorce” in Fineman MA and Thomadsen NS (eds) At the boundaries of law: feminism and legal 
theory (1991) 278; Barratt “Marital agreements” 689. 
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in that women are afforded primary residency of their children and their ex-
husbands are free to pursue their careers while their ex-wives usually have 
to endeavour to work part time to balance their career against child-care 
duties. 28  Accordingly, the harsh realities of systems which encourage a 
clean-break principle and the sanctity of contractual relationships in the 
marital context are undermining the very rights they seek to protect and 
further. It has recently been reported by the World Economic Forum that 
economic equality between men and women will not be achieved for eight 
decades.29 The study by the World Economic Forum of 142 countries found 
that women’s attainments and opportunities in the workplace were 60% 
those of men. A report conducted in 2006 found this percentage to be 
56%.30 South Africa ranked eighteenth overall out of the 142 countries.31 
The gendered wage gap still places women at a disadvantage in the 
workplace and shows no signs of closing.32 
 
 
1.5 RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
1.5.1 Point of departure and assumptions 
 
Our matrimonial law in relation to civil marriages which end in divorce needs 
to be developed further to make allowances for greater judicial discretion 
and a system of equitable distribution. The Constitution guarantees all South 
Africans substantive equality. The guarantee is not fulfilled when children 
are left looking in on the affluence of their fathers while their mothers battle 
to make ends meet while shouldering the primary responsibility of caregiver 
and parent. The legislature and courts should extend and broaden the 
applicability and requirements of section 7(3) of the Divorce Act to 
incorporate all civil marriages. The matrimonial property regime and wide 
judicial discretion applied in England and Wales (and the effect thereof) and 
the current proposed reforms when juxtaposed with the South African 
system make for a challenging and valuable comparative analysis.                                                              28 De Jong “New trends” 80. 29 Bosley C “Female financial equality a lifetime away” 29 October 2014, available at http://www.bdlive.co.za/world/2014/10/29/female-financial-equality-a-lifetime-away  (accessed on 29 October 2014). 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid. 32 Barratt “Marital agreements” 703. 
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1.5.2 Hypothesis 
 
Our current matrimonial property regime applicable to civil marriages does 
not adequately protect women and children and ensure an equitable 
distribution of assets and income. 
 
1.5.3 Methodology  
 
A literature review of South African law as it pertains to marital property 
regimes was conducted. It encompassed a review of statutes, case law, 
common law, textbooks and articles together with internet-based electronic 
material. In addition, a comparative study of English law was conducted as it 
pertains to marital property encompassing a review of statutes, case law, 
common law, textbooks and articles together with internet-based electronic 
material. English law was chosen as it currently follows a system which is 
based on a legislated right of the courts to order an equitable distribution 
upon divorce. This system is currently in a state of flux, however, and the 
acceptability or otherwise of allowing parties to regulate their marital 
property affairs by contractual means is being evaluated and debated. 
 
In chapter 2 a more detailed analysis of the various matrimonial property 
regimes is undertaken. Chapter 3 deals with the difficulties which arise as a 
result of the inflexibility of the South Africa matrimonial property distribution 
system on divorce and the arguments in favour of and against the system 
are discussed and analysed. The exceptions to the strict application of our 
matrimonial property distribution system are set out in chapter 4, which 
includes an analysis of sections 7(3)–7(6) and 9 of the Divorce Act and 
section 8(4)(a) and (b) of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 
of 1998. The question whether the limited application of the exceptions dealt 
with in chapter 4 passes constitutional muster is posed in chapter 5 and a 
comparative analysis of South African matrimonial property law and that of 
England and Wales is undertaken in chapter 6. In chapter 7 
recommendations are made for the possible reform of our matrimonial 
property law on divorce. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
THE MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY REGIMES IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
2.1 HISTORY 
 
South Africa inherited the Roman-Dutch legal system, which embraces the 
idea that parties entering into a marriage may contract out of the default 
matrimonial property system by concluding an antenuptial contract.33 Prior 
to 1984 and the promulgation of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984, 
parties to a civil marriage effectively had two options when choosing which 
matrimonial property regime would govern their marriage. If they did not 
enter into an antenuptial contract, their marriage was automatically in 
community of property34 (that is the default system) and the wife was subject 
to the husband’s marital power.35 The system of marital power placed a wife 
in the position of a minor under her husband’s guardianship. 36  The 
advantage of a civil marriage in community of property was that the wife was 
entitled, at the dissolution of the marriage, to an undivided half share of the 
estate. 
 
Insofar as parties entered into an antenuptial contract, the marriage was out 
of community of property and the parties were able to exercise their rights in 
respect of their estates independently of one another.37 The advantage of 
this system was that the wife was not subject to the marital power of her 
husband (which placed women under the tutelage of their husbands).38 The 
disadvantage was that at the dissolution of the marriage, the financially 
weaker party (usually the wife, particularly if she had elected to stay at home 
and care for the children born of the marriage and perform the function of 
homemaker) was placed in a position where she was not entitled to a share 
in the wealth her husband had accumulated over the years of marriage.  
 
                                                             33 Bonthuys E “Family contracts” 2004 SALJ 881. 34 Edelstein v Edelstein NO  1952 (3) SA 1 (A) at 10. 35 Campher v Campher 1978 (3) SA 797 (O) at 801-802. See also Sonnekus JC “Matrimonial property” in Clark B (ed) Family Law Service (2012) 1.  36Sonnekus in Clark Family law service 3. 37Sonnekus in Clark Family law service 1.  38 Kaganas and Murray “Law and women’s rights” 8. 
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The disadvantaged position of women was highlighted and challenged in the 
area of family and matrimonial law in particular by scholars in the political 
arena.39 These efforts, which were directed at achieving the abolishment of 
the marital power and the treatment of marriage as a partnership of equals, 
paid off and in 1982 a Law Commission project was established to examine 
the Matrimonial Affairs Act 37 of 1953 with particular regard to matrimonial 
property.40 The Law Commission report of 198241 heralded the promulgation 
of the Matrimonial Property Act and the beginning of a perceived move 
towards spousal equality within civil marriages. 
 
The abolishment of the marital power (which was ultimately removed in all 
its forms by section 29 of the General Law Fourth Amendment Act 132 of 
1993) and the extension of equal status to mothers vis-à-vis their children in 
terms of the Guardianship Act 192 of 1993, were seen as measures which 
overcame the last obstacles to affording women equality within the family in 
terms of civil law.42 
 
2.2  CURRENT MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY SYSTEMS 
 
2.2.1  Community of property 
 
Community of property or universal community is the default or ordinary 
system of matrimonial property which applies to all civil marriages concluded 
without an antenuptial contract.43 In essence the system combines all assets 
acquired by each party before and after the marriage into a joint estate 
(save for certain exceptions which include gifts or bequests subject to an 
exclusion clause, non-patrimonial damages, and costs in matrimonial 
proceedings)44 which is then divided between the spouses at the dissolution 
of the marriage.45 In general the debts of each spouse incurred before and 
after the marriage are treated alike (save for the exception created in section 
19 of the Matrimonial Property Act regarding delictual damages of a                                                              39 Kaganas and Murray “Law and women’s rights” 11. 40 Sclater Divorce: A psychosocial study 12. 41 SA Law Commission Project 15. 42 Kaganas and Murray “Law and women’s rights” 13. 43 Church J “Proprietary consequences of marriage” in Joubert WA (ed) The law of South Africa (2006) 73. 44 Church “Proprietary consequences of marriage” 80. 45 Church “Proprietary consequences of marriage” 74. 
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spouse). While the system incorporates the concept of a true partnership 
into marriage, the administrative requirements can be onerous.46 In addition, 
the joint estate is exposed in insolvency proceedings and in respect of 
creditors’ claims generally.47 
 
2.2.2  Separation of property or marriage out of community of property 
 
This matrimonial property system applies where spouses conclude an 
antenuptial contract which specifically excludes the accrual system and all 
forms of community of property and community of profit and loss. 48 
Accordingly, each spouse’s estate is entirely separate from that of the other 
spouse and upon divorce there is no sharing of assets acquired during the 
course of the marriage. A spouse married out of community of property will 
retain the right to claim maintenance in terms of section 7(2) of the Divorce 
Act 70 of 1979 but no cause of action will arise in terms of section 9 of the 
Divorce Act for forfeiture in an instance where no benefit has accrued to a 
spouse in terms of the marriage. 49  Women married in terms of an 
antenuptial contract, out of community of property, after 198450 accordingly 
have no recourse, other than a maintenance claim upon dissolution of the 
marriage regardless of any gross inequities which may arise in 
consequence. 
 
2.2.3  The accrual system 
 
The accrual system was introduced to ameliorate the harsh effects of 
complete separation of property, particularly in situations where one spouse 
has accumulated wealth during the marriage and the other has not been in a 
position to do so.51 The accrual system effectively created a form of deferred 
community of gains in terms whereof parties who entered into an antenuptial 
contract with the operation of the accrual system are financially independent 
during the course of the marriage and at the dissolution of the marriage are 
entitled to share equally in the growth of each other’s respective estates                                                              46 Church “Proprietary consequences of marriage” 85-94. 47 Church “Proprietary consequences of marriage” 94-97. 48 Church “Proprietary consequences of marriage” 107. 49 See para 4.3 below. 50 See paras 4.1 and 4.4 below. 51 Heaton J South African family law 3 ed (2010) 93. 
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from the inception of the marriage.52 The introduction of the accrual system 
therefore went some way towards creating a fairer matrimonial property 
system by which parties could choose to order their property affairs upon 
marriage.  
 
Section 2 of the Matrimonial Property Act states that every marriage out of 
community of property in terms of an antenuptial contract by which 
community of profit and loss is excluded, which is entered into after the 
commencement of the Act, is subject to the accrual system except in so far 
as that system is expressly excluded by the antenuptial contract. However, 
and in the light of the fact that the Act was not made retrospective, civil 
marriages concluded prior to the promulgation of the Matrimonial Property 
Act in terms of an antenuptial contract by which community of property, 
community of profit and loss and accrual sharing were excluded remained 
out of community of property. Section 7(3) of the Divorce Act was 
accordingly promulgated and applies to civil marriages entered into before 
the commencement of the Matrimonial Property Act, in terms of an 
antenuptial contract by which community of property, community of profit 
and loss and accrual sharing in any form are excluded. A court granting a 
decree of divorce in respect of those marriages may, subject to the 
provisions of subsections (4), (5) and (6), on application by one of the 
parties to that marriage, in the absence of any agreement between them 
regarding the division of their assets, order that such assets, or part of the 
assets, of the other party as the court may deem just be transferred to the 
first mentioned party. 
 
Section 7(3) also extends the power of the court to order the transfer of 
assets in respect of marriages out of community of property entered into 
before the commencement of the Marriage and Matrimonial Property Law 
Amendment Act 3 of 1988, in terms of section 22(6) of the Black 
Administration Act 38 of 1927, as it existed immediately prior to its repeal by 
the said Marriage and Matrimonial Property Law Amendment Act 3 of 1988. 
 
 
  
                                                             52 Sonnekus in Clark Family law service 11-12; ss 3 and 4 of the Matrimonial Property Act. 
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2.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS ON MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY 
SYSTEMS 
 
In summary, our “progressive” matrimonial property law allows couples to 
choose which system should apply to their union.53 Prospective spouses, 
whilst they retain the right to create their own contractual matrix which will 
apply to their marriage, generally choose one of the three matrimonial 
property systems provided for by our matrimonial property law, namely 
marriages without an antenuptial contract which are automatically in 
community of property, marriages subject to an antenuptial contract with the 
inclusion of the accrual system, and marriages subject to an antenuptial 
contract which specifically excludes the operation of the accrual system, 
community of property and community of profit and loss. On the face of it the 
hardships created by the strict matrimonial property regimes which existed 
prior to the promulgation of the Matrimonial Property Act were to some 
degree ameliorated by the Matrimonial Property Act54 and the Divorce Act55 
and a semblance of fairness and equality was brought into the South African 
system of matrimonial property distribution on the dissolution of a civil 
marriage. In the next chapter the inflexibility of the matrimonial property 
distribution system on divorce will be scrutinised in more detail. 
 
 
 
  
                                                             53 Church “Proprietary consequences of marriage” 72. 54 By the introduction of the accrual system; Barratt “Marital agreements” 690. 55 By the provision of an equitable redistribution system for marriages confined to an out of community of property regime due to the time constraints imposed by the Matrimonial Property Act. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE INFLEXIBILITY OF THE MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION 
SYSTEM ON DIVORCE  
 
3.1  STRICT APPLICATION OF CONTRACTUAL RULES TO FAMILY 
OR RELATIONAL CONTRACTS UPON DIVORCE 
 
The South African system of matrimonial property division, governed in the 
main by the Divorce Act 70 of 1979 and the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 
1984 has for many years been inflexible. Our law relating to civil marriage 
has its origins in the Roman-Dutch system which recognises the right of 
spouses to exclude the default matrimonial property system in terms of an 
antenuptial contract. 56  The court, unless the parties have resolved the 
financial issues pertaining to their marriage in an agreement of settlement, 
will take cognisance of the manner in which the parties were married, and 
calculate the distribution of assets according to the formula indicated by the 
Matrimonial Property Act, the Divorce Act, case law and/or our common 
law. 57  Where parties have concluded a settlement agreement (which is 
commonplace in South African divorces) the court will apply the terms of the 
agreement without reference to any financial inequities which may arise as a 
result thereof. (The court does, however, retain a discretion where parental 
responsibilities and rights are concerned.)58 There has been an increase in 
the use of and the importance attached to contracts in the realm of family 
law which not only extends to antenuptial contracts but also incorporates 
settlement agreements upon the dissolution of marriages and, more 
recently, cohabitation agreements.59  
 
Moreover, and until recently, there was a noticeable trend in the South 
African law of contract towards disallowing the principles of good faith and 
public policy to upset the dictates of freedom of contract and pacta sunt 
servanda60 where the terms of a contract result in the unfair exploitation of                                                              56 Bonthuys “Family contracts” 881. 57 De Jong M “The need for new legislation and/or divorce mediation to counter some commonly experienced problems with the division of assets upon divorce” 2012 Stell LR 225. 58 Bonthuys “Family contracts” 881. 59 Bonthuys “Family contracts” 881. 60 Ie that valid contracts should be enforced. 
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one of the parties.61 This trend, which is present where parties contract at 
arm’s length (that is not in a family setting), has to a certain extent 
permeated the family law environment.62 There have in the recent past been 
instances where the courts were more inclined to set aside exploitative 
contracts that offended the principles of public policy.63 In Baart v Malan64 a 
husband and wife concluded a settlement agreement in terms of which the 
wife agreed to pay over her entire annual salary and bonus by way of 
maintenance for the two children born of the marriage, until such time as the 
children reached the ages of 35 and 29. The agreement was overturned on 
the basis that it was against public policy for a person not to obtain some 
commercial gain from their efforts in the workplace.65 However, a few years 
later in the case of Brisley v Drotsky 66  a landlord cancelled a lease 
agreement on the basis of late payment of the rent by the tenant. The tenant 
averred that the landlord had orally agreed to extend the time for the 
payment of the rent. In the light of a non-variation clause in the lease 
agreement this argument was rejected. The Supreme Court of Appeal went 
further by stating that the tenant’s argument that the landlord’s use of the 
Shifren principle67 offended the dictates of good faith must fail on the basis 
that the requirement of bona fides or good faith was not a rule of the law of 
contract.68  
 
Even where clear imbalances in the negotiating power between parties are 
evident, the rules of contract have historically been  strictly applied. In Afrox 
Healthcare Bpk v Strydom69 a patient was required to sign a contract in 
terms of which a hospital contracted out of responsibility for all negligence, 
including gross negligence. The patient’s argument was threefold. Firstly, he 
argued that the clause was contrary to public policy, secondly that there was 
a clear imbalance in the bargaining power which existed at the time of 
contracting between the unwell patient who required medical care and the                                                              61 Bonthuys “Family contracts” 890. 62 Bonthuys “Family contracts” 890-891. 63 Bonthuys “Family contracts” 890-891. 64 1990 (2) SA 862 (E). 65 At 869E-F. 66 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA). 67 Which provides that no oral amendment of a contract is effective if the contract contains a non-variation clause, unless such variation is reduced to writing and signed by both parties to the contract. 68 Bonthuys “Family contracts” 891; Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) at 15D-G. 69 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA). 
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hospital which was to provide the care and thirdly that there was a 
constitutional duty on the hospital to provide adequate care. The patient 
relied in addition upon the fact that the clause was contrary to the principle 
of good faith.70 The Supreme Court of Appeal rejected all the arguments. 
More recently, in SH v GF,71 the issue of the variation of a maintenance 
order contained in a settlement agreement came before the Supreme Court 
of Appeal. The court a quo72 found, inter alia, that the maintenance order 
had been varied by oral agreement in spite of the presence of a Shifren 
clause on the basis that it would offend against public policy to enforce the 
non-variation clause and not recognise the variation agreed to between the 
parties.73 The Supreme Court of Appeal, in disallowing the variation in the 
face of a non-variation clause, stated that the validity of a non-variation 
clause such as the one present in SH v GF 74  is itself based on 
considerations of public policy, which considerations are rooted in the 
Constitution. 75  The Supreme Court of Appeal in reaching its decision 
refused to endorse the court a quo’s decision not to enforce the non-
variation clause for reasons of public policy. It went further by stating, as 
mentioned above, that the validity of a non-variation clause is itself based on 
considerations of public policy which are rooted in the Constitution.76 
 
More recently, the Constitutional Court’s decision in Maphango v Aengus 
Lifestyle Properties (Pty) Ltd77 took up the debate of what the role of the 
Constitution is in developing the common-law of contract.78 Interestingly, the 
Constitutional Court was, inter alia, divided on the importance of the 
considerations of fairness, good faith and reasonableness in contractual 
agreements.79 Whilst the Supreme Court of Appeal in the court a quo was 
clearly not prepared to accommodate a view that an unreasonable and 
unfair result stemming from a contract would render it unenforceable,80 the 
Constitutional Court judges recognised a constitutional need for parties to                                                              70At 33F-G. See also Bonthuys “Family contracts” 892. 71 2013 (6) SA 621 (SCA). 72 In GF v SH  2011 (3) SA 25 (NGP).  73 At 33A-C. 74 2013 (6) SA 621 (SCA). 75 At 626A-C. 76 At 626A-C. 77 2012 (3) SA 531 (CC). 78 Dafel M “Curbing the constitutional development of contract law: A critical response to 
Maphango v Aengus Lifestyle Properties (Pty) Ltd” (2014) 131 SALJ 271. 79 Dafel “Curbing the development of contract law” 282. 80 Dafel “Curbing the development of contract law” 283. 
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negotiate in good faith when concluding contracts. The minority judges went 
further in stating that the lack of fairness in a contract could certainly lead to 
its terms being unenforceable in the face of an unjust result.81 The existence 
of an imbalance in bargaining power was also considered in the minority 
judgement as a relevant factor; however, the facts of the case did not 
require a finding in this regard.82 Whilst the minority judgement in Maphango 
v Aengus has certainly not brought about a sea change in the South African 
courts’ approach to the law of contract, the consideration of the important 
aspects of fairness and bargaining power are noteworthy. 
 
3.2 ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF A STRICT CONTRACTUAL 
APPLICATION SYSTEM 
 
Those who favour the strict application of a contractual system such as that 
governing the law of divorce in South Africa argue that it affords a level of 
certainty and predictability to divorcing spouses in respect of what they can 
expect to receive in terms of a financial distribution upon divorce. 83  In 
addition, the strict application of contractual terms recognises (and protects) 
parties’ contractual freedom and freedom of choice84 which is embodied in 
legal systems worldwide. In Printing and Numerical Registration Co v 
Sampson85 the court emphasised the importance of ensuring that parties 
enjoyed the utmost liberty to contract, that contracts entered into freely and 
voluntarily are enforced by courts of justice and that the courts should not 
lightly interfere with parties’ freedom of contract. A further argument in 
support of the application of strict contractual principles in the arena of 
family contracts is the avoidance of paternalism or the over-involvement of 
the State in parties’ private affairs.86 Further to this argument, parties should 
be afforded and guaranteed freedom of choice in relation to the ordering of 
their matrimonial property.87 An argument which further bolsters the sanctity 
of the contract in a family or relational environment is that men and women 
have achieved equality in all spheres of life and women are accordingly able                                                              81 Dafel “Curbing the development of contract law” 284. 82 Ibid. 83 Bonthuys “Family contracts” 895. 84 SA Law Commission Project 15 13; see also Sonnekus “Grense aan kontrakvryheid vir eggenote én voornemende eggenote? (deel 2)” 2010 TSAR 234. 85 (1875) LR 19 Eq 462 465. 86 SA Law Commission Project 15 17. 87 SA Law Commission Project 15 17. 
 17 
to negotiate on an equal footing and reap the benefits of being economically 
viable members of society on a par with their male counterparts.88  
 
3.3  DISADVANTAGES OF THE STRICT CONTRACTUAL 
APPLICATION SYSTEM 
 
Many difficulties arise in the interpretation and enforcement of “family 
contracts”, however, owing to the tension that inevitably arises between the 
strict application of the pure rules of contract to these documents and the 
treatment of the family negotiation process as a commercial one. 89 
Moreover, many liberal theorists support the view that the ordering of the 
family should be a private affair untainted by interference and involvement 
by the State.90 However, if partners in relationships are to be given absolute 
autonomy to order their affairs without any involvement by the legislature or 
the judiciary, while certainty as to the outcome of disputes will prevail, it is 
certain that fairness will not.91  
 
A disadvantage of the inflexible system is that it cannot take judicial 
cognisance of the plethora of issues which may well have existed at the time 
when the agreement pertaining to the marital property system was 
concluded and the changes which have occurred in the relationship during 
the course of the marriage.92 When parties contract with one another in an 
intimate environment, their judgement is clouded and influenced by many 
factors.93 An imbalance of financial power and occupational status leads to 
an imbalance of bargaining power.94 Parties may in addition be labouring 
under cognitive distortion and accordingly be unable to comprehend that 
their marriage may end in divorce and that their spouse may behave in a 
dishonourable way.95 In addition, when parties bargain with one another in 
the family environment they do so while labouring under cultural and gender 
stereotypical expectations.96 Worldwide there is still a perception that the                                                              88 Kaganas and Murray “Law and women’s rights” 11. 89 Heaton “Striving for gender equality” 554. 90 Sinclair J assisted by Heaton J The law of marriage vol 1 (1996) 20-21. 91 For the reasons stated below. See also Bonthuys “Family contracts” 894-896. 92 Chapter 2 above. 93 Bonthuys “Family contracts” 895. 94 Heaton “Striving for gender equality” 550. 95 Heaton “Striving for gender equality” 554. 96 Bonthuys “Family contracts” 896. 
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public and private spheres are divided between men on the one hand and 
women on the other.97 Because women bear the children, they are expected 
to stay at home and nurture and care for the children. The criticism which is 
levelled at women is that these choices are made willingly and freely; 
however, there is an equally compelling counterargument that the choices 
are the result of social pressures and stereotyping.98 Generally, no value is 
ascribed to women’s work in the home. These gender stereotypical 
expectations not only prevent women from driving a hard bargain in order to 
ensure the conclusion of a fair contractual dispensation, they are also the 
cause of the ultimate hardships experienced by women once their 
relationships have broken down.99 In addition, these gender expectations 
are evidenced in many women’s inability to insist upon receiving 
independent advice when deciding which marital property system will govern 
their marriages and their reluctance to assert themselves and insist upon 
what they view (having received such advice) as a fair dispensation. 100 
While feminists argue that a woman’s biological capacity to bear children is 
irrelevant to her ability to match a man in the workplace and that the private 
and public sphere division of labour between men and women should be 
ignored,101 this presupposes that the division of labour and care in respect of 
the children born from relationships and the domestic responsibilities in the 
home are equal, which they are not.102 Women still assume the lion’s share 
of domestic responsibilities103 and the equal division of labour in the private 
sphere has yet to be reached in society.104This imbalance is exacerbated by 
the fact that working environments generally are not accommodating to 
women who are compelled to balance and manage both work and family 
commitments. 105  The inflexible system may therefore not always be 
equitable to women who have spent their time caring for the home and 
looking after the children during the marriage. 
 
                                                             97 Heaton “Striving for gender equality” 549. 98 Heaton “Striving for gender equality” 552. 99 Bonthuys “Family contracts” 896-897. 100 Heaton “Striving for gender equality” 554. 101 Kentridge J “Measure for measure: Weighing up the costs of a feminist standard of equality at work” in Murray C (ed) Gender and the new South African legal order (1994) 87. 102 De Jong “New trends” 79; Kentridge “Measure for measure” 85. 103 Heaton “Striving for gender equality” 549. 104 Sinclair The law of marriage 67-69. 105 Heaton “Striving for gender equality” 550; Sinclair The law of marriage 27. 
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The avoidance of unfair results is being sacrificed at the altar of legal 
certainty and finality. 106  The difficulties which arise in the negotiation of 
antenuptial contracts as referred to above are also present when parties 
negotiate settlement agreements at the dissolution stage of their marriages. 
Because of the nature of such negotiations, these contracts do not always 
reflect the true intention of the contracting parties and accordingly cannot be 
adjudicated by a strict application of contractual rules.107 This is exacerbated 
by the fact that in addition women tend to be more risk and conflict averse 
than men. 108  Accordingly they will opt for a negotiated process upon 
dissolution of their marriages rather than a more conflictual litigation 
process; this choice can lead to a gender-biased result as women are more 
inclined to relent and accept a lesser financial settlement, for example, in 
exchange for what they consider to be greater control in regard to their 
children.109  
 
The very basis of a family contract is good faith and trust and family 
contracts should accordingly be adjudicated against this backdrop and with 
this requirement uppermost in the mind of the judiciary.110 To treat parties to 
a contract as if they are equals when there has been an imbalance in 
bargaining power is to further strengthen the hand of the stronger party.111 
Moreover, if family contracts are not adjudicated in accordance with the 
requirement of a fair outcome, the consequences are far more dire than 
those encountered in a purely commercial setting – they strike at the very 
core of society and an unfair result will usually impact upon children and 
women who are simply unable to foresee or counter the consequences of 
the contractual inequity.112 
 
In short, the factors surrounding the negotiation of a family or relational 
contract often lead to the weaker party (usually the woman) agreeing to a 
less than favourable matrimonial property system prior to marriage or an                                                              106 Bonthuys “Family contracts” 895. 107 Ibid.  108 Heaton “Striving for gender equality” 568; Stark B “Psycho-feminism and divorce law: Oedipus wrecks” in Mercuro N and Stark B (eds) International Review of Comparative Public 
Policy (1992) 57. 109 Fineman “Societal factors” 57. 110 Bonthuys “Family contracts” 896. 111 Bonthuys “Family contracts” 897. 112 Bonthuys “Family contracts” 897. 
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inequitable financial settlement upon divorce. A woman may agree to 
exclude the accrual system or to clauses which will effectively absorb any 
growth in her prospective husband’s estate in terms of the accrual. She may 
not have the capacity to understand or contemplate the end result of her 
choices for the reasons already dealt with.  
 
In this regard, while the choice of the accrual system may be a hugely 
advantageous one for many couples it can also lead to gross unfairness in 
situations where clauses are inserted into the contract which effectively 
negate the possibility of any share in the growth of the wealthier spouse’s 
estate or the accrual system is excluded in its entirety. In Barnard v 
Barnard,113 a wife-to-be, more than forty years the junior of her prospective 
husband, was induced to consult only with her husband’s attorney and her 
husband (twice divorced) persuaded her to enter into an antenuptial contract 
which excluded the accrual system – at the time of the marriage she was an 
unsophisticated young girl of 24. The court rejected her argument that the 
contract was contrary to public policy because of her husband’s superior 
bargaining power 114  and in so doing relied on Sasfin (Pty) Limited v 
Beukes115 in reaching its decision that contracts should be set aside on the 
grounds of public policy only in very rare and limited circumstances.116 The 
court assumed that the parties to the antenuptial contract negotiated on an 
equal footing and that as such they were deemed to know and understand 
the terms of the contract they signed.117 
 
  
                                                             113 2003 (3) SA 741 (C). 114 Heaton “Striving for gender equality” 555. 115 1989 (1) SA 1 (A). 116 2003 (3) SA 741 (C) at 754D. 117 2003 (3) SA 741 (C) at 754E. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE: FLEXIBILITY IN CIVIL MARRIAGES 
WITH THE OLD STANDARD FORM ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACT AND 
CUSTOMARY MARRIAGES 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
There are exceptions to the rule of strict application of contractual laws 
which are of limited assistance to the weaker party where unfairness would 
otherwise result. 118 These exceptions do not, however, go far enough in 
remedying the problems which arise from the application of an inflexible 
matrimonial property system and there remains a need for an appropriate 
and realistic examination of the circumstances surrounding (and influencing) 
the parties at the time of contracting119 and the application of special policy 
considerations, such as the best interests of children, equality and non-
discrimination in family law matters.120 
 
4.2 SECTION 7(3) READ WITH SECTION 7(4) OF THE DIVORCE ACT 
 
Firstly, as far as civil marriages are concerned, section 7(3) of the Divorce 
Act 70 of 1979 authorises a court granting a decree of divorce in respect of 
a marriage with complete separation of property, entered into before the 
commencement of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984 on 1 November 
1984, to order, on application by one party, that a share in the other party’s 
assets as the court may deem just be transferred to the applicant party. 
Section 7(4) of the Divorce Act provides that the order in terms of section 
7(3) may only be granted if the court is satisfied that it would be just and 
equitable and that the applicant party contributed directly or indirectly to the 
maintenance or increase of the estate of the other party. Here, the ordinary 
duties of the wife in the private sphere are considered to be a contribution in 
                                                             118 See paragraphs 4.2 to 4.4 below.  119 Heaton “Striving for gender equality” 556. 120 See GF v SH 2011 (3) SA 25 (NGP) at 29F–30J. Although this case was overturned on appeal in 
SH v GF 2013 (6) SA 621 (SCA), the appeal did not deal with the considerations that determine public policy in family law matters.  
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terms of section 7(4). 121  In the matter of Beaumont v Beaumont 122  the 
prerequisites set out in section 7(3) were discussed and the interpretation of 
section 7(4) agreed on as embracing the performance by the wife of her 
ordinary duties of looking after the home and caring for the family.123  
 
The interpretation of what constituted a “contribution” for the purposes of 
section 7(4) was confirmed in Bezuidenhout v Bezuidenhout124 in which the 
court noted that both parties were extremely hard working – the husband in 
his business and the wife in the home (as a home-maker and mother) and to 
a certain extent in the husband’s business. The court went further in stating 
that it considered these separate roles (of the husband in his business and 
the wife in the home) to be of equal importance in determining their 
respective contributions for the purposes of section 7(3).125 In the limited 
number of civil marriages concluded with complete separation of property 
before 1 November 1984, the courts accordingly have the discretion or 
flexibility to redistribute the parties’ assets equitably and to take into account 
a wife’s contribution as homemaker and caregiver of the children. 
 
The rationale behind the promulgation of sections 7(3) and 7(4) was the fact 
that no accrual system existed prior to the promulgation of the Matrimonial 
Property Act, and this led to an inequitable result for parties who married 
prior to 1984, out of community of property.126 Section 7(3) was accordingly 
introduced to protect those who, for whatever reason, chose, prior to 1984 to 
enter into a marriage out of community of property instead of in terms of the 
default regime, namely community of property.127 In addition, section 7(3) 
was amended in 1988 to extend the operation of the redistribution 
mechanism to marriages which were subject to section 22(6) of the Black 
Administration Act 38 of 1927, and concluded before the coming into 
operation of the Marriage and Matrimonial Property Law Amendment Act 3 
                                                             121 S 7(4) of the Divorce Act; Bezuidenhout v Bezuidenhout 2003 (6) SA 691 (C); Beaumont v 
Beaumont 1987 (1) SA 967 (A); Kritzinger v Kritzinger 1989 (1) SA 67 (A). 122 1987 (1) SA 967 (A). 123 At 997F-G. 124 2003 (6) SA 691 (C). 125 At 711I-712B. 126 See also para 2.2.3 above. 127 Law Commission Report Project 15 5. 
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of 1988 on 2 December 1988.128 The limited operation of section 7(3) was 
controversial at the time of its promulgation and remains so.129 
 
4.3  SECTIONS 8(4)(a) and (b) OF THE RECOGNITION OF 
CUSTOMARY MARRIAGES ACT 120 of 1998 
 
The second exception is found in sections 8(4)(a) and (b) of the Recognition 
of Customary Marriages Act which confer the powers contained in sections 
7, 8, 9 and 10 of the Divorce Act on the court appointed to dissolve a 
customary marriage and empowers the court to make any equitable order 
that it deems just. Section 7(1) of the Recognition of Customary Marriages 
Act originally provided that the proprietary consequences of customary 
marriages entered into before the commencement of the Recognition of 
Customary Marriages Act would be subject to customary law. Section 7(2) 
stated further that a monogamous customary marriage concluded after the 
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act would be a marriage in community 
of property. 
 
The constitutionality of sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the Recognition of 
Customary Marriages Act was challenged in the case of Gumede v 
President of the Republic of South Africa.130 The Constitutional Court held 
that section 7(1) in its entirety and the words “entered into after the 
commencement of this Act” in section 7(2) were unconstitutional and 
invalid.131 In reaching its decision the court also considered the applicability 
of section 8(4)(a) of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act against the 
backdrop of the limited application of section 7(3) of the Divorce Act. It was 
argued by the government that the same limitation as that contained in 
section 7(3), namely that for the section to be applicable the marriage must 
be out of community of property, should likewise be applied to customary 
marriages.132 The effect of this argument, if successful, would have been 
that only those customary marriages which were out of community of 
property would have fallen within the ambit of section 8(4)(a) of the 
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act and been eligible for an equitable                                                              128 Heaton South African family law 134. 129 Barratt “Marital agreements” 690. 130 2009 (3) SA 152 (CC). 131 At 177A-C. 132At 170B-C. See further para 5.3 below for a more detailed discussion of this case. 
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distribution order. The Constitutional Court held that there was no cogent 
reason for limiting the scope of the equitable jurisdiction conferred on the 
divorce court seized with the dissolution of a customary marriage either by 
date133 or by matrimonial property regime.134 It therefore appears that the 
courts do have the discretion or flexibility to redistribute the parties’ assets 
equitably and to take into account a wife’s contribution as homemaker and 
caregiver of the children in all customary marriages, regardless of when they 
were concluded and of which matrimonial property system applies to the 
marriage. 
 
4.4  SECTION 9(1) OF THE DIVORCE ACT 
 
Section 9 of the Divorce Act states that the court may make an order to the 
effect that the patrimonial benefits of the marriage should be forfeited by one 
party in favour of the other, either wholly or in part, if the court having regard 
to the duration of the marriage, the circumstances which gave rise to the 
breakdown thereof and any substantial misconduct on the part of either of 
the parties, is satisfied that if the order for forfeiture is not made, one party 
will be unduly benefited in relation to the other. However, forfeiture cannot 
be utilised to rectify the usual consequences that arise as a result of the 
matrimonial property regime, for reasons of fairness.135 In Wijker v Wijker136 
the court a quo found that an order of forfeiture was competent on the basis 
of a principle of fairness 137  in circumstances where a spouse had not 
contributed towards the management, administration or profit-making of the 
applicant spouse’s business. The order was overturned on appeal and the 
appeal court was at pains to point out that section 9 contains no provision 
which allows for the application of a principle of fairness.138 The guiding 
principle in a forfeiture order has clearly been stated as being whether or not 
either party would be unduly benefited, taking into account the factors set 
out in the section. Whether or not the division of the estate on divorce would 
be unfair, taking into account an imbalance in the respective contributions of 
                                                             133 S 7(1). 134 At 172B-D. See also s 7(3) of the Divorce Act read with s 8(4)(a) the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act. 135 Heaton South African family law 131. 136 1993 (4) SA 720 (A). 137 At 731C-D. 138 At 731E-G. 
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the parties to the marriage which led to the growth in the other’s estate, is 
irrelevant.139 
 
Furthermore, a practice has arisen in terms of which forfeiture orders are 
only granted against the spouse whose estate has shown the smaller 
accrual (where an antenuptial contract is in place) or who contributed the 
least to the joint estate (in marriages in community of property). 140 
Effectively the spouse who claims forfeiture will do so on the basis that their 
estate has accrued more, alternatively that their spouse contributed less 
than they did to the joint estate. On either basis, the poorer spouse will be 
denied the right to share in the spoils of the marriage.141 However, nowhere 
in the Divorce Act does it state that the spouse whose estate has accrued 
more than the other, or who has contributed to a greater extent to the joint 
estate may not forfeit a percentage of that accrual or share in the joint estate 
to the poorer spouse on the grounds that he or she has been unduly 
benefited, in the light of the duration of the marriage, the circumstances 
which gave rise to the breakdown thereof and any substantial misconduct on 
the part of the “wealthier” spouse. 
 
The practice of forfeiture by the poorer spouse has developed on dubious 
grounds without taking into account the statements of the Roman and 
Roman-Dutch authorities that spouses can forfeit those assets which they 
brought into the marriage.142 A further difficulty is that in the development of 
the practice the authorities have lost sight of the fact that a spouse’s non-
monetary contributions can and should be accorded value when ordering 
forfeiture.143 
 
In Roman times, marriages were generally similar to the current regime of 
marriage out of community of property.144 In addition, there were certain 
provisions pertaining to forfeiture in terms of which a wife could forfeit her 
dos (which was a contribution towards the household expenses made at the 
commencement of the marriage by the wife) and a husband his donatio                                                              139 See also Engelbrecht v Engelbrecht 1989 (1) SA 597 (C) at 601F-G.  140 Bonthuys E “The rule that a spouse cannot forfeit at divorce what he or she has contributed to the marriage: An argument for change” 2014 SALJ 439. 141 Bonthuys “An argument for change” 439. 142 Bonthuys “An argument for change” 441. 143 Bonthuys “An argument for change” 450. 144 Bonthuys “An argument for change” 442 note 4. 
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propter nuptias (a marriage settlement made at the commencement of the 
marriage to support the wife in the event of the husband’s death). 145 
 
In Roman-Dutch Law, marriages were akin to the current regime of marriage 
in community of property and a spouse could likewise forfeit those assets he 
or she had brought into the marriage.146 
 
Prior to the promulgation of the Divorce Act in 1979, case law varied, with 
some courts allowing for the forfeiture of assets brought into a marriage by a 
spouse and others disallowing such an order. The generally accepted rule 
that a spouse could not forfeit that which he had brought into the marriage 
was introduced in Celliers v Celliers,147 in which Solomon J (with Mason J 
and Curlewis J concurring) decided that, in the light of the conflicting Roman 
and Roman-Dutch case law, and earlier South African case law, a court 
could not order a guilty spouse to forfeit property which he or she had 
brought into the marriage.148 The court went further in stating that, even if a 
rule existed whereby property could be forfeited, such a rule had become 
obsolete.149  
 
The interpretation of section 9 is now entrenched and forfeiture orders are 
only applied to those benefits derived from a marriage that the spouse 
against whom the order is sought did not contribute to or generate. 150 
Moreover, a court may not order the partial forfeiture of a spouse’s separate 
estate – the rule applies only to the benefits derived from the marriage.151 
This is dissimilar to Roman-Dutch and English law152 which recognised and 
recognises that, in order to arrive at an equitable solution, the transfer of 
assets brought into the marriage by one spouse to the other spouse may be 
required.  
 
                                                             145 Bonthuys “An argument for change” 443. 146 Bonthuys “An argument for change” 443. 147 1904 TS 926 at 926-927. 148 At 933. 149 At 936. See also Bonthuys “An argument for change” 446. 150 Bonthuys “An argument for change” 453. 151 Hahlo The law of husband and wife 376; Rousalis v Rousalis 1980 (3) SA 446 (C) at 450D-E (cannot order partial forfeiture of separate asset). 152 See para 6.2 below. 
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A further casualty of the development of the way in which forfeiture orders 
are dealt with has been the manner in which a wife’s non-monetary 
contributions are dealt with. In the matter of Gates v Gates,153 the court 
expressed the opinion that a wife’s contributions in performing domestic 
duties, by virtue of the fact that they were a cost-saving exercise for the 
benefit of the earning spouse, fell to be credited to her account in the 
determination of the respective contributions to the joint estate. 154  The 
principle espoused in Gates, which ascribed value to a wife’s non-monetary 
contributions to a joint estate, was criticised in the post-1979 case of Singh v 
Singh,155 in which a wife was only allowed a twenty percent share of the joint 
estate in a marriage in community of property in the light of her having done 
very little to establish her contribution to the estate other than keeping house 
and looking after the children. 156  Upon the dissolution of a marriage in 
community of property a spouse is entitled a half share of the joint estate, 
and it is thus anomalous that, in a forfeiture situation, the right to share is 
assessed on a contribution basis, that is, a calculation is made on the basis 
of each spouse’s contribution to the estate. The correct application of the 
rule should arguably utilise the fifty percent share in the joint estate as the 
starting point rather than the spouses’ respective contributions to the joint 
estate.157  
 
Accordingly and while an order in terms of section 9 may appear to be an 
attempt to ameliorate the harsh consequences of a strict application of the 
marital property regime, it only serves to protect the wealthier spouse and 
fails to take into account any contribution made by the poorer spouse in the 
private sphere.  
 
4.5  PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE VARIOUS SYSTEMS AND 
THEIR APPLICATION UPON THE DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGES 
 
Spouses who marry after 1984 and do not fall within the purview of sections 
7(3) of the Divorce Act may find themselves destitute upon the dissolution of 
                                                             153 1940 NPD 361 at 365-366. 154 Bonthuys “An argument for change” 447-448. 155 1983 (1) SA 781 (C). 156 At 790C-F. See also Bonthuys “An argument for change” 450. 157 Bonthuys “An argument for change” 453. 
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the marriage and without any right of recourse available to them to remedy 
this inequitable result.  
 
Upon the dissolution of a marriage out of community of property the poorer 
spouse may have a claim for maintenance in terms of section 7(2) of the 
Divorce Act. However, she will not have a claim for forfeiture in terms of 
section 9 of the Divorce Act nor will she have a claim in terms of section 7(3) 
unless she falls within the very narrow ambit of the section.158 Moreover, 
and to compound the potential inequitable consequence of her choice of 
matrimonial property regime, she will be unlikely to receive a permanent 
maintenance award in keeping with the increased support by our courts of 
the clean-break principle. 159  Although the clean-break principle may be 
effective in equitable distribution jurisdictions where parties are awarded 
sufficient assets to ensure an equitable result160 (and hence do not need 
more than a rehabilitative term of maintenance), the consequences in a 
system like the one applicable in South Africa (which has very limited 
redistribution mechanisms), compounded by the high incidence of 
maintenance defaulters,161 force many women into poverty after divorce. In 
Beaumont v Beaumont 162  the clean-break principle was dealt with in a 
comparative analysis and accepted as being part of our law. It was noted 
that courts should always bear in mind the possibility of using their powers in 
such a way as to achieve a complete termination of the financial 
dependence of one party on the other if circumstances permit. 163  It is 
important to note that in the Beaumont case the court was dealing with a 
redistribution situation and as such was able to contemplate that in those 
circumstances, with the grant of an adequate financial award, it was feasible 
to do away with maintenance on the basis that the wife would be able to live 
off the fruits of the capital settlement. The court went on to state that there 
would no doubt be many cases in which the constraints imposed by the 
facts would not allow justice to be done between parties by effecting a final 
termination of the financial dependence of one on the other.164                                                              158 See para 4.1 above. 159 Heaton “Changing the contours” 425; Sinclair The law of marriage 151. 160 Parkinson P Family law and the indissolubility of parenthood (2011) 27; De Jong “New trends” 81; see also paragraph 6.2 below. 161 Sinclair The law of marriage151. 162 1987 (1) SA 967 (A). 163 At 993A-C. 164 At 993D-F. 
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Another aggravating factor for which the system of matrimonial property 
distribution does not cater upon divorce is the fact that, in many instances, 
the major asset which the wealthier spouse has built up over the course of 
the marriage is an ability to earn an elevated income or human capital 
acquired as a result of the wife’s efforts in the home and in respect of the 
children. 165  There is no entitlement in our law for a spouse who has 
supported her husband and allowed him to go from strength to strength in 
the workplace to share in this enhanced income stream upon divorce.166  
 
Moreover, where the accrual system does apply in a marriage, there are 
numerous other ways in which an antenuptial contract can be structured to 
ensure that, upon divorce, any growth has been absorbed by an elevated 
commencement value or excluded list of assets. An order for forfeiture in 
terms of section 9 of the Divorce Act is not available to a poorer spouse in 
these circumstances, owing to the limited application of section 9.167 As a 
further exacerbating feature, where a wife has stayed at home (as a 
consequence of choices made within the marriage), sacrificed her career 
and been dependent upon her husband for years, the court will expect her in 
most circumstances168 to achieve financial independence within a very short 
time. Therefore, the effect of an inflexible matrimonial property system 
coupled with the growing acceptance of the clean-break principle can and 
does lead to hardship and an inequitable result for many spouses 
(particularly women) upon divorce. 
 
In the 2012 cases of EA v EC169 and JW v CW170 a different approach was 
utilised in endeavouring to ameliorate the harsh consequences that arose on 
divorce from “no-sharing” antenuptial contracts. 171  Here, the wives 
endeavoured to assert claims based on universal partnership in order to 
circumvent the unfairness that arose from the application of their 
matrimonial property regimes. Both cases failed on the bases, inter alia, 
that, to prove a universal partnership in an instance where a no-sharing                                                              165 Heaton “Striving for gender equality” 570; De Jong “New trends” 82. 166 De Jong “New trends” 82. 167 See para 4.3 above. 168 Except for the very elderly wife who has not worked for decades. 169 2012 ZAGPJHC 219. 170 2012 (2) SA 529 (NC). 171 Barratt A “Marital agreements” 688. 
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antenuptial contract existed would be to contradict the terms of the contract 
and allow a revocation of the contract which could not be allowed.172  
 
It has accordingly again become necessary to examine the question 
whether or not the limited application of the remedy provided for in section 
7(3) as read with section 7(4) of the Divorce Act is justifiable, particularly in 
the light of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 – a factor 
which was not examined by the Law Commission173 in 1990. This factor will 
therefore be examined next. 
  
                                                             172 Barratt “Marital agreements” 689. 173 SA Law Commission Project 12 Report on the review of the law of divorce: Amendment of 
section 7(3) of the Divorce Act, 1979 (Pretoria 1990). See also chapter 5 in this regard. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PRESENT POSITION WHERE COURTS 
HAVE A JUDICIAL DISCRETION ONLY IN CERTAIN MARRIAGES 
 
5.1 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
 
Section 9(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, states 
that everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection 
and benefit of the law. Section 9(3) states in addition that the state may not 
unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more 
grounds, including race, gender and marital status. The Constitutional Court 
has on many occasions made it clear that substantive equality and not mere 
formal equality forms the basis of this guarantee.174  
 
The test for determining whether the equality clause in section 9 has been 
breached was set out in Harksen v Lane NO.175 The court has to determine 
whether the law or action in question differentiates between people or 
categories of people. If it has been found to do so, the court has to 
determine whether a legitimate governmental purpose exists for the 
differentiation and whether there was a rational connection between the 
purpose of the government and the differentiation in question.176 Once that 
enquiry has been undertaken it is necessary to determine whether the 
differentiation amounts to discrimination and if so whether such 
discrimination is unfair. The differentiation does amount to discrimination if it 
is based on one of the listed grounds set out in section 9, and in those 
circumstances unfairness will be presumed (and insofar as the 
differentiation is not on a listed ground, an objective inquiry into whether the 
differentiation amounts to discrimination which is unfair will have to be 
undertaken).177 A determination will then need to be made as to whether or 
not the unfair discrimination is justifiable under section 36 of the                                                              174 President of the Republic of South Africa and another v Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC); Brink v 
Kitshoff NO 1996 (4) SA 197 (CC) at 214F-G, 216J-217B, 217C-E; Bannatyne v Bannatyne (CGE 
as Amicus Curiae) 2003 (2) SA 363 (CC) at 377B-378A. See also Heaton “Striving for gender equality” 549. 175 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC), which dealt with the interim Constitution, Act 200 of 1993, and in particular with s 8(1) thereof. 176 At 325F-G. 177 At 328B-G. 
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Constitution.178 The factors to be taken into account in establishing unfair 
discrimination were stated in the Harksen case as including the position of 
the complainants in society and whether they had been discriminated 
against in the past, the nature of the provision or power being scrutinised 
and the purpose sought to be achieved by it, the extent to which the 
discrimination has affected the rights of the complainants and whether it has 
led to an impairment of their dignity.179 
 
5.2  LAW COMMISSION FINDINGS 
 
The question of the extension of the applicability of section 7(3) of the 
Divorce Act so as to automatically apply to all marriages out of community of 
property was dealt with by the South African Law Commission in July 
1990. 180  There were a number of arguments raised in support of the 
extension of the section, including the fact that women who excluded the 
accrual system from their marriages would be in the same economic 
position after a divorce as those protected by the judicial discretion accorded 
by section 7(3), 181 the fact that parties may well choose to exclude the 
accrual system through being wrongly advised or simply through 
ignorance182 and the fact that there is often an imbalance of power present 
at the pre-contractual negotiation stage and this can translate into an 
economically disadvantageous marriage contract.183 
 
The arguments raised against the expansion of the discretion in section 7(3) 
included the need to recognise and maintain the parties’ contractual 
freedom of choice,184 the principle that the law does not protect those who 
have contracted foolishly, 185  the fact that the discretionary concept 
contained in section 7(3) would lead to legal uncertainty, 186  the 
understanding that section 7(3) was an emergency measure for a limited                                                              178 Petersen v Maintenance Officer, Simon’s Town Maintenance Court 2004 (2) SA 56 (C) at 63G-64B; Brink v Kitshoff NO 1996 (4) SA 197 (CC) at 218A-F. See also Heaton J Casebook on South 
African family law 3 ed (2010) 255-256. 179 At 328H. 180 SA Law Commission Project 12 Report on the review of the law of divorce: Amendment of 
section 7(3) of the Divorce Act, 1979 (Pretoria 1990).  181 SA Law Commission Report on the review of the law of divorce 4. 182 SA Law Commission Report on the review of the law of divorce 5. 183 SA Law Commission Report on the review of the law of divorce 11. See also para 3.3 above. 184 SA Law Commission Report on the review of the law of divorce 13. 185 SA Law Commission Report on the review of the law of divorce 15. 186 SA Law Commission Report on the review of the law of divorce 17. 
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time187 and furthermore the argument that the legal discretionary system is a 
rich man’s law.188  
 
The Commission ultimately decided against the extension of the judicial 
discretion conferred by section 7(3), and in so doing, expressed approval for 
the German system of matrimonial property law which is similar to our 
present accrual system. 189  The Commission disagreed with the English 
system in terms of which there is a separation of assets during the marriage 
but an equitable distribution on divorce. 190 At the time of the review the 
Constitution had not been promulgated and accordingly questions of 
equality and compliance with the ideals stated in section 9 were not taken 
into account by the Commission in reaching its ultimate decision. 
 
5.3 GUMEDE V PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH 
AFRICA 191 
 
In Gumede v President of the Republic of South Africa the court had to 
decide whether or not to uphold the court a quo’s decision to declare the 
legislative provisions regulating the proprietary consequences of a 
customary marriage set out in, inter alia, sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the 
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 inconsistent with the 
Constitution and invalid. In so doing, the enquiry set out in Harksen v 
Lane192 was applied,193 that is, whether the provisions discriminated unfairly 
against the applicant and other women similarly situated and if so whether 
such discrimination was justifiable.194  
 
The sections in question differentiated between the proprietary 
consequences of marriages concluded before the commencement of the 
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act and those concluded after the 
commencement of the Act. Women married prior to the commencement of 
the Act (“old marriages”) would be married in accordance with the customary                                                              187 Ibid. 188 Ibid. 189 SA Law Commission Report on the review of the law of divorce 22. 190 Ibid. 191 2009 (3) SA 152 (CC). 192 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC). 193 See para 5.1 above. 194 At 159E-G. 
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law as codified and applicable to their marriage195 and women married after 
the commencement of the Act (“new marriages”) would be married in 
community of property and profit and loss unless these consequences were 
excluded by an antenuptial contract.196  
 
The government defended its position on the basis, inter alia, that the 
discrimination was justifiable because section 8(4)(a) of the Recognition of 
Customary Marriages Act conferred the equitable distribution powers 
contained in section 7(3) of the Divorce Act on the divorce court dealing with 
all customary marriages.197 The court found that the differentiation between 
women who were party to an “old marriage” and those who were party to a 
“new marriage” was discriminatory on the basis of gender and as between 
husband and wife. 198  In reaching its ultimate decision the court also 
considered it necessary to consider the scope and efficacy of section 8(4)(a) 
of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act. The scope of the equitable 
jurisdiction conferred by section 8(4)(a)199 was held to be applicable to all 
customary marriages upon consideration of the circumstances relevant to 
the marriage in determining a just and equitable result.200 Accordingly, the 
court confirmed that the provisions of sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the 
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act unfairly discriminated against the 
applicant on the ground of gender on the basis that the impugned sections 
unfairly distinguished between marriages on the basis of the date on which 
they were concluded (that is either before or after the commencement of the 
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act).201 
 
The court stressed that any distinction between the consequences of 
customary marriages concluded prior to the commencement of the 
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act and those entered into thereafter 
were clearly discriminatory, inconsistent with the Constitution, invalid, unfair                                                              195 At 168A-C. What this entailed for Mrs Gumede was that she would be married in accordance with the Kwazulu Act on the Code of Zulu Law 16 of 1985 and the Natal Code of Zulu Law Proclamation 151 of 1987 the effect of which was that all property would be owned by the head of the family, Mrs Gumede’s husband. Had Mrs Gumede married after the effective date of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act, she would have been married in community of property. 196 At 164H-165B. 197 At 169C-170B. 198 At 167H-J. 199 By its incorporation of the provisions of s 7(3) of the Divorce Act. 200 At 172B-D. 201 At 173G-J. 
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and not justifiable.202 The comments made in the Gumede judgment, namely 
that the power conferred on the divorce courts to exercise equitable 
jurisdiction is consonant with the underlying ethos of customary law which 
strives for equity in resolving conflict, 203  are telling. In Gumede the 
redistribution power contained in section 7(3) as read with section 8(4)(a) of 
the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act was extended to all  customary 
marriages regardless of the matrimonial property system applicable thereto. 
The question which arises is why this discretion (and indeed ethos) should 
not be extended to all marriages and not only those falling within the purview 
of section 7(3) of the Divorce Act and section 8(4)(a) and (b) of the 
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act? 
 
5.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Firstly, a distinction is drawn between civil marriages concluded out of 
community of property before 1 November 1984 (or 2 December 1988 in the 
case of African spouses) and those concluded after that date. The question 
which arises is whether the use of the wedding date in section 7(3) as the 
criterion as to whether or not the remedy of equitable distribution will be 
extended to parties is a fair methodology. There are many women who have 
married after 1984 with the exclusion of the accrual system or in terms of 
antenuptial contracts with onerous conditions and who are then left destitute 
on divorce without the remedy of a fair distribution.204 They are in the same 
situation as those who married with complete separation of property prior to 
1984, but without the benefit of an equitable distribution remedy. To 
distinguish on the basis of the date of the marriage is arbitrary and 
discriminatory.205 It is arguable that this differentiation on the ground of the 
date of the marriage infringes the equality clause contained in section 9 of 
the Constitution.206 In taking the argument to its logical conclusion, and in 
determining whether or not a legitimate government purpose exists for the 
differentiation, recourse can be had to the arguments raised by the South                                                              202 Bekker J and Van Niekerk G “Gumede v President of the Republic of South Africa: Harmonisation, or the creation of new marriage laws in South Africa?” 2009 SA Public Law 209. 203 Gumede case at 172A. 204 Heaton South African family law 136. 205 Sinclair The law of marriage 147. 206 Heaton South African family law 136. See also Heaton J “Family law and the Bill of Rights” in Mokgoro Y and Tlakula P (eds) Bill of Rights compendium (1998) para 3C26. 
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African Law Commission207 in refusing to extend the judicial discretion in 
1990, namely the need to respect the contractual choices made by 
prospective spouses and the danger of the legal uncertainty which would 
arise should the extension be allowed. It is submitted that the argument 
pertaining to the sanctity of a party’s right to contract simply cannot be 
upheld in the light of the research which exists pertaining to the many 
difficulties which arise between contracting parties in a family setting.208 In 
addition, the Gumede decision went a long way towards destroying the 
argument for legal certainty as a ground of justification for the retention of a 
narrow judicial discretion as contemplated in section 7(3) of the Divorce 
Act.209 Objectively, to discriminate against any spouse, whatever the form 
their marriage may take, on the arbitrary basis of the date of their marriage 
(or for that matter the matrimonial property system applicable to their 
marriage) certainly appears to amount to discrimination which, if tested 
objectively, leads to gross unfairness. The grounds raised by the Law 
Commission would in addition be unlikely to constitute sufficient grounds for 
a favourable finding in terms of section 36 of the Constitution.210  
 
Secondly, following the Gumede decision there is differentiation between 
civil marriages and customary marriages. This differentiation, like the 
discrimination found in section 7(3), has to be tested in order to ascertain 
whether or not it amounts to unfair discrimination. While there are clear 
differences between customary marriages and civil marriages and the court 
in the Gumede decision stressed the importance of recognising these 
differences,211 these differences cannot outweigh the need for fairness in the 
redistribution of matrimonial property as established in the Gumede 
decision. 212  The government’s purpose in making provision for the 
redistributive power was to enable courts to rectify any injustices arising 
from the strict application of a matrimonial property system. To restrict this 
power to certain types of marriages cannot serve a legitimate government 
purpose. 213  The legitimate government purpose for the extension of the 
power in the Gumede decision is clearly to avoid inequities arising in                                                              207 SA Law Commission Report on the review of the law of divorce 13, 15 and 17. 208 See para 3.3 above. 209 Heaton South African family law 136. See also para 5.3 above. 210 See para 5.1 above. 211 At 171F-H. 212 At 173G-174H; See also Heaton South African family law 137. 213 Heaton South African family law 137. 
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customary marriages. Objectively, to refuse to extend the same remedy to 
spouses in civil marriages leads to inequality and unequal protection of the 
law and accordingly to unfair discrimination. Moreover, while it is unclear 
whether people who are not black may conclude customary marriages, 
insofar as they cannot the differentiation may amount to unfair discrimination 
on the basis of race as well. 214  Accordingly, the fact that the equitable 
distribution provision contained in section 7(3) is extended to all customary 
marriages (regardless of the proprietary regime) whereas it is only 
applicable to civil marriages which are out of community of property and 
concluded before a certain date is further evidence of the need for a 
constitutional challenge to the provision and its scope on the basis that this 
differentiation amounts to discrimination against spouses in civil 
marriages. 215 Moreover, the argument previously raised by the Law 
Commission that the extension of the remedy in section 7(3) of the Divorce 
Act would lead to uncertainty in our law does not hold water in the light of 
the extension of the power of distribution to all customary marriages.216 At 
the time of the South African Law Commission’s review 217  the 1996 
Constitution had not yet been promulgated and an argument in favour of the 
extension of the discretionary system in terms of section 9 of the 
Constitution would, it is submitted, have been a compelling one, particularly 
in the light of the Gumede decision and the position of the financially weaker 
party in customary marriages.  
 
A proposed solution to the difficulties created by our current matrimonial 
property law in respect of civil marriages, coupled with the clean-break 
principle inherited from Western legal systems, would be the extension of a 
general redistributive power218 to all marriages. This general redistributive 
power should be applicable, regardless of when the marriage was 
concluded, how it was concluded or whether or not it was a civil or 
customary marriage. The extension of this power would be a relatively 
simple way of conferring the relevant power on the courts to deal with 
inequities as and when they arise. This could be achieved by a constitutional 
challenge based upon similar themes to those found in Gumede in respect                                                              214 Heaton South African family law 137. 215 Bonthuys “An argument for change” 459. 216 Heaton South African family law 136. See also para 5.3 above. 217 SA Law Commission Report on the review of the law of divorce 22. See also para 5.2 above. 218 Bonthuys “An argument for change” 459; Heaton “Striving for gender equality” 556, 562. 
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of the limited application of section 7(3) of the Divorce Act and the extension 
of a general redistributive power to all customary marriages by section 
8(4)(a) of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act. 219  This general 
redistributive power has been in force in English and Welsh matrimonial 
property law since the 1970s with the enactment of the Matrimonial 
Proceedings and Property Act of 1970, which was consolidated into the 
Matrimonial Causes Act of 1973.220 Moreover, the adjustive discretion was 
introduced by section 7(3) to avoid gross and inequitable discrepancies in 
parties’ financial position after divorce. Accordingly, a minimum requirement 
should be that this power be extended wherever there is complete 
separation of property.221  
 
  
                                                             219 See para 5.3 above. 220 Sinclair The law of marriage 52. See also chapter 6.2 below. 221 Sinclair The law of marriage 145 note 388. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
THE CURRENT MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY SYSTEM APPLICABLE IN 
ENGLAND AND WALES AND THE PROPOSED INCLUSION OF 
MARITAL PROPERTY AGREEMENTS 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
The courts in England and Wales have far-reaching powers and judicial 
discretion to make equitable distribution awards between all divorcing parties 
since the matrimonial property system applicable in England and Wales is 
one of complete separation of assets during the marriage with an equitable 
distribution on divorce.222 Currently, the courts in England and Wales base 
their decisions regarding matrimonial property distribution in divorce matters 
on the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.223 Sections 22A to 24G of the Act set 
out the types of orders the court may make in exercising its judicial discretion. 
These include periodical payments, lump sum payments, maintenance 
payments, property adjustment and pension sharing orders. Section 25 of the 
Act contains the matters which a court is to have regard to in exercising its 
discretion. These matters include the welfare of any children born of the 
marriage,224 the income, earning capacity, property and financial resources, 
both current and in the foreseeable future, of the parties,225 their standard of 
living, 226  their age and the duration of the marriage, 227  the respective 
contributions made or likely to be made to the welfare of the family, and the 
conduct of the parties.228 Section 25(2)(b) of the Act further directs the court 
to take into account the financial needs, obligations and responsibilities of the 
parties to the marriage. This concept of financial need has been one of the 
most problematic areas for courts when exercising their discretion.229 Where                                                              222 Clark B “English law of divorce and dissolution and finance and property distribution on divorce and dissolution” in Clark B (ed) Family Law Service (LexisNexis Durban 2012) 10. 223 The Law Commission “Consultation Paper no 208: Matrimonial property, needs and agreements – A supplementary consultation paper” available at http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/cp208_matrimonial_property.pdf (accessed on 24 September 2014) para 2.5.   224 S 25(1). 225 S 25(2)(a). 226 S 25(2)(c). 227 S 25(2)(d). 228 S 25(2)(f). 229 The Law Commission “Consultation Paper no 208: Matrimonial property, needs and agreements” para 3.25. 
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there are children born of the marriage, the court will commence the process 
by focusing on provision for the children’s needs, their primary carer’s needs 
and the provision of a home and an income for the children and their primary 
carer.230 The statute is, however, silent on what the courts should be aiming 
to achieve in making the distribution orders contemplated in section 25.231 
Accordingly, the courts have developed the law and the approach has 
changed over the years.232 
 
6.2 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
Historically the courts had the right to vary a settlement on divorce or order a 
settlement in a manner similar to the South African notion of forfeiture.233 
When the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 was promulgated the need for this 
device fell away as the Act allowed judges and registrars to make just orders 
when distributing matrimonial property on divorce on the basis of the “minimal 
loss” principle which entailed an endeavour to put the parties in the position 
they would have been in had the marriage not broken down. 234  The 
Matrimonial Proceedings and Family Affairs Act 1984 amended the 
Matrimonial Causes Act in certain respects, including the replacement of the 
“minimal loss” principle with the “clean-break” principle. 235  The underlying 
themes of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Family Affairs Act include an 
express emphasis on minor children, the wife’s earning capacity, the 
consideration of “conduct” of the parties and the clean-break principle.236 The 
Matrimonial Causes Act subsequently conferred upon the courts a broad 
judicial discretion to make orders on the dissolution of marriages pertaining to 
financial provision, 237  property adjustment, 238  the sale of property 239  and                                                              230 The Law Commission “Consultation Paper no 198: Marital property agreements – a consultation paper” available at http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/cp198_marital_property_agreements_consultation.pdf (accessed on 24 September 2014) para 2.27. 231 The Law Commission “Consultation Paper no 208: Matrimonial property, needs and agreements” para 2.12. 232 The Law Commission “Consultation Paper no 208: Matrimonial property, needs and agreements” para 2.13. 233 Sinclair J “Financial provision on divorce: Need, compensation or entitlement” 1981 SALJ 469 472.  234 Sinclair “Financial provision” 472. 235 Sinclair The law of marriage 142 note 379. 236 Wilkinson KHP and De Haas MR Property distribution on divorce 3 ed (1989) 53.  237 S 23. 238 S 24. 239 S 24A. 
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pension sharing.240 These powers are specifically exercised with an emphasis 
on the welfare of minor children and ensuring the termination of financial 
obligations between the parties on a just and reasonable basis.241  
 
The difficulty that the courts faced in exercising their discretion, however, was 
the lack of guidance in reaching fair orders.242 In the absence of any guidance 
in this regard the courts developed their own manner of dealing with the 
equitable distribution of matrimonial property according to the parties’ 
reasonable requirements.243 The trend that developed was one of providing 
for a spouse’s reasonable requirements, the effect of which was that, in a 
situation where there was a disparity in the wealth of spouses, the poorer 
spouse’s reasonable requirements would be provided for and any surplus 
would remain with the wealthier spouse.244 Redistribution was applied on a 
scale which allowed the poorer spouse to maintain his or her matrimonial 
standard of living.245 In many cases the courts applied the so-called one-third 
rule, whereby the poorer spouse received a third of the family assets and the 
remaining two-thirds remained with the other spouse. 246  This approach 
changed in 2000, with the decision in White v White.247 In this case the court 
took a view that spouses should be treated equally, regardless of what tasks 
or roles they performed or adopted during the marriage and ruled that the 
distribution of assets should take place on a shared basis. This led to what 
was known as the “sharing” principle248 which did not equate to an equal 
division but nonetheless was used as a general guide.249 The development of 
the sharing principle meant that even in cases where a spouse’s domestic 
financial contributions far outweighed the domestic contribution of the other 
spouse, and the poorer spouse’s financial needs were more than taken care                                                              240 S 24B. 241 S 25. 242 The Law Commission “Consultation Paper no 208: Matrimonial property, needs and agreements” paras 3.20, 3.23, 3.26 and 3.33. 243 The Law Commission “Consultation Paper no 208: Matrimonial property, needs and agreements” para 3.33.  244 The Law Commission “Consultation Paper no 198: Matrimonial property agreements” paras 2.34-2.35. 245 Dart v Dart [1966] 2 FLR 286. 246 Wachtel v Wachtel [1973]2 WLR 366. 247 [2001] 1 AC 596, [2000] 2 FLR 981. See also The Law Commission “Consultation Paper no 198: Matrimonial property agreements paras 2.46-2.51. 248 The Law Commission “Consultation Paper no 198: Matrimonial property agreements” paras 2.59-2.61. See also The Law Commission “Consultation Paper 208: Matrimonial property, needs and agreements” para 2.17; Barratt A “Marital agreements” 692. 249 Barratt “Marital agreements” 692. 
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of, any surplus would still be shared by the parties.250 In addition there was an 
inconsistency between regions in ascertaining the financial needs of parties 
and an inconsistent exercise of the judicial discretion in different regions.251 
Following upon the development of the law after the White decision there has 
been regular press and public criticism of the level of awards often made in 
favour of wives balanced with a level of concern regarding the need to ensure 
equality between divorcing spouses.252 An issue which seems to go hand in 
hand with the expressed difficulties, and which has led to a call for certainty, 
was the call for a level of recognition for marital property agreements.  
 
 6.3 PRENUPTIAL AND POSTNUPTIAL AGREEMENTS  
 
In the nineteenth century prenuptial and postnuptial agreements were 
contractually void on grounds of public policy. 253  In more recent times, 
however, they have been taken into account by the courts as one of the 
factors to be considered in reaching a decision as to an equitable 
distribution.254The Supreme Court in England stated recently in the matter of 
Radmacher v Granatino255 that “this rule is obsolete and should be swept 
away”. 256 The court went further and afforded decisive weight to the pre-
nuptial agreement entered into between the divorcing parties257 and started 
the debate in regard to no-sharing antenuptial contracts in England.258 This 
was done on the basis that the agreement was entered into willingly and 
knowingly by responsible adults and that the husband (who interestingly 
enough was not the breadwinner but the homemaker and carer of the 
children) had a proper understanding of the consequences of his 
agreement.259 Lady Hale in her dissenting judgment referred to the fact that 
the question of the enforceability or otherwise of antenuptial contracts was                                                              250 The Law Commission “Consultation Paper no 208: Matrimonial property, needs and agreements” para 2.17. 251 The Law Commission “Consultation Paper no 208: Matrimonial property, needs and agreements” paras 3.30, 3.36, 3.37. 252 The Law Commission “Consultation Paper no 208: Matrimonial property, needs and agreements” paras 3.38, 3.41. 253 The Law Commission “Consultation Paper no 198: Marital property agreements” para 1.27; Barratt A “Marital agreements” 693. 254 Ibid. 255 [2010] UKSC 42. 256 At para 52. 257 At para 123. 258 Barratt A “Marital agreements” 692. 259 At paras 114, 119 and 129. 
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now in the hands of the Law Commission and Parliament.260 As to how the 
matter would be dealt with in the interim, the court was of the view that courts 
would take an antenuptial agreement into account when applying section 25 
of the Matrimonial Causes Act in accordance with its developing 
jurisprudence. 261  While the judges in the Radmacher case respected the 
public interest in the fair and just exercise of the court’s discretion they 
acknowledged the benefit of an appreciation of party autonomy as well, 
however within limits. 262 The most salient points which emerged from the 
Radmacher case were essentially that a court is not obliged to give effect to 
nuptial agreements but must afford the appropriate weight to such 
agreements;263 the agreement will be only one of the matters which the court 
will take into account 264  and the court should give effect to a nuptial 
agreement that has been freely entered into unless to do so would lead to an 
unfair result265 − effectively fairness trumps autonomy when examining the 
facts of each case.266 The court in addition did not distinguish between pre- 
and postnuptial agreements (which they referred to as “separation 
agreements”) and the efficacy of the judgment accordingly extends to both.267 
 
 6.4 LAW COMMISSION 
 
In the light of these developments a project and consultation process was set 
up in 2011 by the Law Commission for England and Wales to review the law 
relating to agreements made before or during a marriage or civil partnership 
which seek to regulate the couple’s affairs regarding, inter alia, the financial 
consequences of divorce. 268  Although the project formally commenced in 
2009, the consultation paper was not published until January 2011, because 
the Commission was awaiting the outcome of the Radmacher v Granatino 
decision.269 The scope of the project in question was extended to cover two 
further aspects of the law relating to financial orders, namely the role of 
                                                             260 At para 133. 261 At para 83. See also para 6.1 above. 262 At para 78; Barratt “Marital agreements” 693. 263 At para 2. 264 At para 3. 265 At para 75; Barratt “Marital agreements” 693. 266 Barratt “Marital agreements” 694. 267 At para 63. 268 The Law Commission “Consultation Paper no 198: Marital property agreements” para 1.4. 269 See para 6.3 above. 
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provision for needs on divorce 270  and recommendations about non-
matrimonial property.271 The Law Commission included financial need in the 
scope of the project because there was a substantial degree of uncertainty as 
to what the concept meant and there had been differing applications of the 
concept by different courts. By way of an example of the uncertainty that can 
and does arise in the adjudication of financial needs, an interesting decision 
was recently handed down by Mostyn J, a High Court family division judge. In 
adjudicating a dispute over the sharing of assets in a divorce matter Mostyn J 
reduced the wife’s entitlement to share in the assets of the marriage on the 
basis that she had started a relationship with an army officer. The judge was 
of the view that she accordingly needed a smaller settlement than if she had 
remained single.272 The definition of financial need will be delineated by the 
Family Justice Council in due course;273 however, it has been suggested that 
a formulaic approach to the division of assets and maintenance may be 
proposed. 274  In 2014, the final report of the Law Commission was 
published. 275 Insofar as marital property agreements were concerned, the 
Law Commission was in favour of the abolishment of the common law rule 
that agreements pertaining to financial provision on separation would be 
illegal.276 Interestingly, the Commission commented on the importance of the 
certainty which a nuptial agreement would introduce, which outweighed the 
importance of parties’ rights to contractual autonomy. 277  Furthermore, the 
Commission recommended that legislation be introduced to provide for 
“qualifying nuptial agreements”. These agreements would have to meet 
certain requirements, and would, it predicted, be utilised in appropriate                                                              270 See para 6.1 above. 271 The Law Commission “Consultation Paper no 208: Marital property, needs and agreements” para 1.2. 272 Gayle D “Divorcing wives should keep away from new romances once battling their husbands for cash, says top judge” 23 September 2014, available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2765989/Divorcing-wives-away-new-romances-battling-husbands-cash-says-family-court-judge.html (accessed on 29 September 2014). 273 Trim H “The law commission’s report on matrimonial property, needs and agreements” 27 February 2014, available at http://www.familylaw.co.uk/news_and_comment/hayley-trim-s-analysis-the-law-commission-s-report-on-matrimonial-property-needs-and-agreements# (accessed on 24 September 2014). 274 Trim “The law commission’s report” 1. 275 The Law Commission (Law Com no 343) “Matrimonial property, needs and agreements” 27 February 2014, available at http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc343_matrimonial_property.pdf (accessed on 24 September 2014).  276 The Law Commission (Law Com no 343) “Matrimonial property, needs and agreements” para 4.28. 277 The Law Commission (Law Com no 343) “Matrimonial property, needs and agreements” para 5.35. 
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circumstances where the wealth of parties exceeded the amount required to 
meet their needs. 278 A draft Nuptial Agreements Bill was annexed to the 
report.279 The Law Commission, however, recognised the dangers inherent in 
parties’ contracting at a time when they intended the marriage to continue.280 
The Law Commission accordingly issued the caution that qualifying nuptial 
agreements could not be utilised to contract out of the obligation to provide 
for one another’s financial needs, which would include a party’s future need 
for housing, childcare and income or any other aspect pertaining to financial 
need. 281  The definition of financial needs was also addressed by the 
Commission and it was explained that it is far wider than the concepts of 
spousal support (in Canada) and alimony (in the United States of America) 
which contemplate periodical payments towards income. Financial need in 
England and Wales encompasses income and capital provisions for present 
and future requirements, the provision of a home and provision for old age.282 
Against this backdrop parties are expected to obtain independence from one 
another as soon as is reasonably and feasibly possible, with an emphasis on 
the need not to impose an artificial time limit on the period applicable in 
various cases.283 
 
Furthermore, and insofar as the requirements for the qualifying nuptial 
agreements were concerned, the Law Commission recommended that these 
include a contractually valid agreement made by deed in terms of which the 
parties acknowledge the fact that the agreement will remove the court’s 
discretion save in situations where a party has effectively contracted out of 
the obligation to provide for the needs of the other. 284 Furthermore, both 
parties must have received financial disclosure from the other at the time of 
                                                             278 The Law Commission (Law Com no 343) “Matrimonial property, needs and agreements” para 5.4. 279 Appendix A to the report. 280 The Law Commission (Law Com no 343) “Matrimonial property, needs and agreements” para 5.34. 281 The Law Commission (Law Com no 343) “Matrimonial property, needs and agreements” para 5.68. 282 The Law Commission (Law Com no 343) “Matrimonial property, needs and agreements” para 3.8. 283 The Law Commission (Law Com no 343) “Matrimonial property, needs and agreements” paras 3.65-3.67. 284 The Law Commission (Law Com no 343) “Matrimonial property, needs and agreements” para 6.40. 
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contracting and must also have received independent legal advice.285 The 
Law Commission expressed a view that qualifying nuptial agreements would 
essentially be for parties who had previously been married and wished to 
safeguard assets from their previous marriage and parties who had provided 
amply for their soon to be ex-spouse’s financial needs and wished to 
safeguard their surplus.286 Conversely, qualifying nuptial agreements would 
not be appropriate or available to young couples marrying for the first time. 
Although the decision in Radmacher v Granatino demonstrated the increasing 
willingness of the courts to reflect the terms of a marital property agreement 
in financial orders, nothing has really changed. 287  Until such time as the 
relevant legislation is passed it remains up to the court to decide whether or 
not it will take a marital property agreement into account when exercising its 
discretion. The marital property agreement will simply be one of the factors 
which the court will take into account and the parties to the agreement cannot 
oust the court’s jurisdiction to make financial orders. 288 
 
  
                                                             285 The Law Commission (Law Com no 343) “Matrimonial property, needs and agreements” paras 6.91, 6.125. 286 The Law Commission (Law Com no 343) “Matrimonial property, needs and agreements” para 5.4. 287 The Law Commission (Law Com no 343) “Matrimonial property, needs and agreements” para 4.31. 288 The Law Commission (Law Com no 343) “Matrimonial property, needs and agreements” para 4.32. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Western society increasingly favours the clean-break principle in the 
distribution of matrimonial property on divorce.289 This principle is premised 
and justified on the basis that women have attained equality in all aspects of 
their lives including the workplace, remuneration and the division of domestic 
chores and childcare responsibilities.290 Taken to its logical conclusion, this 
principle implies that neither party to a marriage should have any financial 
obligation following divorce and the need for financial relief should ultimately 
become redundant. However, substantive equality between men and women 
has yet to be achieved and the reality of divorce is that at the end of a 
marriage there is usually a spouse who has had the opportunity of generating 
more wealth and has greater prospects of future earnings – often thanks to 
the sacrifices made by the spouse who bears the burden of domestic 
responsibilities and child care. 291 Husbands to a large extent are able to 
accumulate wealth during the course of a marriage and wives who have 
assumed the non-remunerative roles in the home are, at the termination of 
the relationship left with no discernible assets.292 
 
While there are ways in which parties can structure their financial affairs prior 
to marriage which will lead to a fair dispensation upon divorce, there are in 
addition a number of regimes available to prospective spouses marrying in 
South Africa which can and do lead to inequity on divorce and often lifetime 
poverty and economic difficulties for the poorer spouse. 293 While there is 
certainly an obligation on prospective spouses to educate themselves as to 
the ramifications of their decisions, when there is a failure to adequately do so 
and this failure leads to a manifestly unfair result, there has to be a remedy 
available to ameliorate the injustice. It is not a complete argument to rely 
upon the sanctity of contract or the certainty that a formulaic matrimonial 
property system provides. However, our matrimonial property system                                                              289 See para 1.4 above. 290 See para 1.3 above. 291 See para 4.5 above. 292 Barratt “Marital agreements” 689. 293 See para 3.3 above. 
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applicable to civil marriages is formulaic and rule driven.294 A positive aspect 
of the system is that it lends certainty as to what parties can expect when 
divorcing. 295  However, it fails to provide the necessary remedy when a 
divorcing party is left without a home or means of subsistence. Our courts, 
when faced with a manifestly unfair result arising from a particular 
matrimonial property regime or a settlement agreement entered into in terms 
of a negotiated process, have very little discretion or ability to ameliorate the 
financial plight of the poorer spouse – who is often the wife owing to social 
and cultural norms and strictures.296 Our matrimonial property law in relation 
to civil marriages is weighted in favour of sharing, the default common-law 
position being that of an in community of property regime.297 However, where 
parties to a civil marriage have specifically contracted out of the common-law 
position and then gone further and excluded the ameliorating effect of the 
accrual system, the Divorce Act permits an uncritical enforcement of this 
position and fails to provide a remedy.298  
 
By way of an example, a woman who marries after 1984 in terms of an 
antenuptial contract with the express exclusion of the accrual system and 
who then, with her husband’s consent, stays at home to care for the children 
born of the marriage and sacrifices her career for a decade, will find herself 
destitute upon divorce. In addition, the South African matrimonial property 
system does not have the power or ability to take into account the human 
capital which has been built up over the years of the marriage at the expense 
and with the assistance of the homemaker/carer spouse.299 She will not be 
able to rely upon the remedy provided by section 7(3) of the Matrimonial 
Property Act 88 of 1984,300 nor will she have a claim in terms of section 9(1) 
of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979.301 She may have a claim for maintenance for a 
limited period of time,302 but this will be of short duration and is certainly not 
an automatic right, 303  and thereafter she will have to be able to sustain 
herself. It has also been made clear by the courts that a maintenance claim is                                                              294 See paras 2.3 and 3.1 above. 295 See para 3.2 above. 296 See para 5.4 above. 297 Barratt “Marital agreements” 693. 298 Barratt “Marital agreements” 698. 299 See para 1.4 above. 300 See para 4.2 above. 301 See para 4.4 above. 302 See para 1.3 above and especially insofar as the clean-break principle is concerned.  303 Barratt “Marital agreements” 700. 
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not akin to a redistribution of assets claim and cannot be squeezed into this 
matrix. 304  In addition and should she not have had proper recourse to 
independent legal advice and driven a hard enough bargain when concluding 
the antenuptial contract (or the settlement agreement), the court will probably 
not be able to come to her assistance unless she has the means and the 
stamina to challenge the constitutionality of the rule bound civil marriage 
order in a Constitutional Court setting, or unless she was able to assert and 
prove the contractual requirements of duress or undue influence.305  
 
By way of comparison, such a spouse’s counterpart living in England or 
Wales would be far better off. Currently, the court would make an equitable 
distribution in terms of sections 23 and 24 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 
1973, taking into account the matters set out in section 25 of the Act306 and, 
depending upon the financial health of the respective estates of the parties to 
the marriage, she could expect to be provided with a home, a capital 
settlement and sufficient income to provide for her financial needs both 
current and future.307 Looking into the future, and should the notion of the 
qualifying nuptial agreement be made law in England and Wales, any 
agreement concluded between parties cannot preclude the responsibility to 
provide for the needs of the other – hence the spouse in this example would 
still be protected.308 Moreover, the provision for her financial needs would not 
be for an unreasonably short time and would take into account the actual 
circumstances surrounding her ability to care for herself and the children born 
of the marriage in years to come.309 Moreover, should the spouse in question 
not have had recourse to independent legal advice and full and proper 
financial disclosure by her prospective husband at the outset and prior to the 
signature of the qualifying nuptial agreement, it would appear that the 
agreement would then be subject to judicial scrutiny and may well not be 
taken into account at all, these factors being a requirement proposed by the 
Law Commission. 310  Additionally, section 25(2)(b) takes cognisance of a 
party’s future earning potential 311  and this is also taken into account in                                                              304 Ibid. 305 See para 3.3 above. 306 See para 6.1 above. 307 See para 6.4 above. 308 See para 6.4 above. 309 See para 6.4 above. 310 See para 6.4 above. 311 See para 6.1 above. 
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providing for the financial needs of the poorer spouse and children born of the 
marriage. The English courts therefore retain a healthy ability to take full 
cognisance of a wife’s contribution in the home in a non-discriminatory 
manner312 and make allowances for the sacrifices made by such a spouse in 
terms of their career for the good of the family and the home313 or for a 
prospective spouse’s inability to see into the future when concluding an 
antenuptial contract.  
 
In addition, a spouse to a customary marriage, concluded at any stage 
whether before or after 1984 or before or after the promulgation of the 
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998, the equitable power of 
distribution provided for in section 8(4)(a) of the Recognition of Customary 
Marriages Act (and by extension section 7(3) of the Divorce Act) would be 
available to the court in distributing the matrimonial property of both spouses 
in the marriage. This remedy would be available to her, regardless of the 
matrimonial property regime governing her customary marriage.314 
 
It is noteworthy that England and Wales are considering a matrimonial 
property system which incorporates both elements of a broad judicial 
discretion and a form of antenuptial agreement. According to Van Wyk, the 
amalgamation of a discretionary system and a conceptual approach with a 
clear structure and fixed rules is virtually impossible. 315  As England and 
Wales appear to be favouring such an amalgamation it will be interesting to 
see whether the system proves to be a workable one. The courts have 
already gone some way towards developing the law in regard to nuptial 
agreements and recognised such agreements as being a factor to be taken 
into consideration when making an order in terms of section 24 of the 
Matrimonial Causes Act.316 The key to managing the juxtaposition of a party’s 
right to contractual autonomy and a broad judicial discretion seems to be the 
notion of fairness. If the agreement does not lead to a manifestly unfair result, 
the terms have been taken into account by the courts in reaching a decision 
as to the property distribution order applicable.317 The Law Commission has                                                              312 Barratt “Marital agreements” 701. 313 Barratt “Marital agreements” 699. 314 See paras 1.4 and 4.3 above. See also note 16.  315 SA Law Commission Project 15 17. 316 See para 6.3 above. 317 See para 6.3 above. 
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in addition stressed the need for requirements at the time of contracting, 
namely that legal advice be obtained and financial disclosure made and 
provisos pertaining to the content of the agreements, namely that they are 
relevant in situations where parties have amassed some wealth before the 
marriage and furthermore that no party can contract out of the obligation to 
provide for the financial needs of the other.318 All in all it would appear that 
the exercise of a judicial discretion, coupled with the existence of antenuptial 
contracts, is a workable and effective solution in situations where manifestly 
unfair results arise upon dissolution of a marriage.  
 
The extension of the broad judicial discretion to civil marriages ending in 
divorce could be relatively easily achieved in South Africa, as has been 
demonstrated in the case of Gumede v The President of the Republic of 
South Africa.319 A level of certainty could still exist in that agreements which 
resulted in a “fair” dispensation upon divorce would not be scrutinised by the 
courts while those that did not would be capable of being overturned by the 
judiciary and replaced by an equitable and fair distribution order. That being 
said, the extension of the power should ideally be along the lines of that 
currently in place in England and Wales and recourse should be had to the 
sentiments of the Law Commission: An effective equitable distribution system 
should take cognisance of a primary carer’s need for housing, an income for 
a reasonable period of time (and not an arbitrarily short rehabilitative term), 
provision for retirement and the recognition of the valuable human capital and 
earnings potential available to the economically viable spouse as an asset.320 
Moreover, the law pertaining to the conclusion of antenuptial contracts should 
be scrutinised and amended to incorporate more stringent provisions 
pertaining to the time when the contracts can and should be concluded (that 
is, well before the marriage date), financial disclosure and the importance of 
independent legal advice. No sharing antenuptial contracts which lead to a 
gender-biased and discriminatory outcome when juxtaposed with our 
entrenched right to equality cannot stand up to scrutiny in the current 
constitutional environment.321 
 
                                                             318 See para 6.4 above. 319 See paras 5.3 and 5.4 above. 320 See para 6.4 above. 321 Barratt “Marital agreements” 704. 
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To quote Albert Einstein, “Life is like riding a bicycle. To keep your balance, 
you must keep moving”.322 Similarly, the development of the law must be 
dynamic and outwardly focused otherwise failure to provide for the ever- 
changing needs of society is an inevitability.  
 
  
                                                             322 Bright Drops “27 Quirky Albert Einstein quotes on everything” available at http://brightdrops.com/albert-einstein-quotes (accessed on 12 October 2014). 
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